Category: Philosophy of religion

How did DNA, genetic codes and enzymes happen?

~ Gregory Lewis ~ Leave a comment

Part 4 in 20 Atheist answers to questions they supposedly can’t

4. How did DNA and amino acids arise?
5. Where did the genetic code come from?
6. How do irreducibly complex enzyme chains evolve?

Short answer: Science!

Longer answer: These three questions neatly cover the calling cards of the intelligent design movement. The big idea is that standard evolutionary mechanisms (mutation and differential survival repeated loads and loads of times) is just inadequate to explain how we got genetic codes, or replicators in the first place, or particular biological structures which have this feature called ‘irreducible complexity’.

It’s worth pointing out that these ideas only really carry favour amongst groups of (fairly evangelical) Christians, and are rejected all-but-unanimously by practicing scientists, and that doubt in evolutionary theory declines with education in general and biological background in particular. But let’s not solely rely on social epistemology steers, and talk about the merits themselves. Continue reading “How did DNA, genetic codes and enzymes happen?” →

Why is the Universe rational?

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Third in series .20 Atheist answers to questions they supposedly can’t.

3. Why is the universe rational?

Short answer: Why shouldn’t it be? Why does God make us think it should be?

Long answer: The argument implied by this question is something like this. It is very surprising that the universe is tractable to reason is naturalism/Atheism is true. Not so if God exists: for he would want to create a universe that the people inside it could understand. So that we find ourselves in a tractable universe is evidence for the existence of God. Continue reading “Why is the Universe rational?” →

What explains the fine tuning of the Universe?

~ Gregory Lewis ~ Leave a comment

Second in series 20 Atheist answers to questions they supposedly can’t.

2. What explains the fine tuning of the universe?

Short answer: There’s no rigorous way to define fine tuning that’s hospitable to a fine tuning argument. Even if there were, a multiverse ensemble would be about as good an explanation as Theism.[ref] Another move atheist could make is to ‘trump’ fine tuning with an argument from evil. For even if it is the case that a fine tuned universe alone would support theism, it might be that further knowledge (it is fine tuned but has lots of evil in) will support atheism, in a similar way that knowing the accused was in the house at the time of the murder is some evidence for his guilt, but finding out he was locked in the basement is evidence for his innocence. (cf. Draper’s work on this). [/ref]

Long answer: The fine tuning or teleological argument has had a long and august history, and it has a new lease of life due to modern scientific discovery. For a variety of parameters (the gravitational constant, the cosmological constant, and so on) any slight deviation from their actual values would, as far as we can work out, lead to a universe where intelligent life is impossible. So surely this is a cosmological watch for want of a watchmaker? Continue reading “What explains the fine tuning of the Universe?” →

What caused the Universe?

~ Gregory Lewis ~ Leave a comment

First in series “20 Atheist answers to questions they supposedly can’t”

  1. What caused the universe to exist?

Short answer: Dunno. But God isn’t any better an explanation.

Longer answer: My understanding of early universe cosmology is limited, but we don’t have a fully tied up account of the early picoseconds of the universe. Perhaps one day we will, as well as an explanation of what ‘kicked off’ the big bang. However, that will just push the problem one step back: what caused the cause of the big bang? etc. Continue reading “What caused the Universe?” →

Should the prior probability for gratuitous evil be high?

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Abstract

The discussion of the problem of evil has developed from a logical disproof, to an inductive argument, to a abductive inference. Here an even more modest approach to using evil is suggested: that evil shows that the prior probability of Theism must be very low, prior to any further investigation. This approach sidesteps the standard defences to the problem of evil, and thus indeed permits Atheist to adopt a more defensive strategy. All they need to do is show that the balance of arguments that may be offered do not shift this prior assignment. Here the field is briefly surveyed, the new approach is defended from two more obvious lines of attack. Continue reading “Should the prior probability for gratuitous evil be high?” →

Does the moral argument undercut the argument from evil?

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Adam: It is often wondered whether evil gives reason to believe there is no god. There are many such responses to this idea. One is to suggest that although at first appearance suggests that evil ‘counts against’ god, further sober enquiry reveals that this is no evidence at all. Theism can provide a similarly good explanation. In a sense, we give ‘God’s alibi’ to the prosecution to the argument from evil.

Alternatively, and more recently, a popular response is that of sceptical Theism: Namely, the principle that we simply aren’t in a position to judge whether the evils we observe really count against God. We simply aren’t able to judge the matter. Instead of God’s alibi, we simply show that our trial could never reach a safe verdict in the first place.

Also, one can simply accept that the balance of evil in the world really does, taken alone, suggest there is no God. However, this only considers evil alone. Considering the rest of the available evidence, we observe that there are much greater reasons in favour of God.

However one common objection, amongst popular sources at least, is to appeal to morality itself to ‘trump’ the argument from evil. When Atheist offers an argument from evil, Theist says some variant of “Well, to run the argument from evil in the first place, you need some account of what good and evil is. Yet the only plausible source of value is God.”

Charles: I think this argument could just be another argument like fine tuning or whatever else designed to rebut the argument from evil: “Okay, so there’s a problem of evil, but I’ve got an argument from morality which is even better.” However, I think when this sort of response is offered, it’s more an undercutting defeater: that, until Atheist gives a good answer to the moral argument Theist poses, Theist need not worry about answering the problem of evil. Continue reading “Does the moral argument undercut the argument from evil?” →

Fine tuning, a dialogue

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Revised from this:

Scene setting

Charles: Consider our universe. It seems to be precisely tuned for life. Were its initial parameters even slightly different, the universe would have no stars, or no matter, or collapse in on itself a moment after it arose, amongst many other life denying fates.

It would be strange if this ‘just so happened’ in a purposeless, undesigned way. That out of all the possibilities, we landed on the one that permitted life. Theism (and other more ‘anthropocentric’ hypotheses, admittedly) provide a much more plausible explanation for the data. Because God wanted living beings, he would make a life-permitting universe. It makes a much better fit for the facts.

Debbie: How are you constructing this sort of inference? I can see ways you can do it, but what do you have in mind? Continue reading “Fine tuning, a dialogue” →

A simple ontological argument for Atheism

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Modern (Modal) forms of the ontological argument go something like this (modal moves in brackets).

  1. Possibly, God exists (◊G)
  2. If God exists, necessarily God exists (G → □G)
  3. Possibly Necessarily God exists (◊□G, From [1] and [2])
  4. Necessarily God exists (□G, from [3] and S5)

God exists

The modal logic works (even if you find S5 unintuitive), and generally one stipulates God such that it has the property of necessarily existing.

The key premise is [1]. Although colloquially it seems obvious God is possible, it is probably best thought of as possible in an epistemic sense: for all we know it is possible that God exists (even if we don’t think it likely). Yet that is distinct from saying it is a metaphysical possibility: that there really are possible worlds in which God exists. And it is this claim which is needed to drive the OA.

So what, though? We can conceive God’s existence without contradiction, seems to be well-formed proposition, etc. etc. So all of these epistemic reasons appear to give warrant to the metaphysical claim via Yablo conceivability or similar measures. What’s the problem?

The same applies to God not existing! Continue reading “A simple ontological argument for Atheism” →

Not “God isn’t nice”, but “God isn’t there”

~ Gregory Lewis ~ Leave a comment

There is a common misconception in discussions surrounding evil and God: that when presenting the argument from evil, the conclusion sought is that God is failing to live up to his moral responsibilities – that God isn’t very nice. Yet this is nonsense: the God all standard arguments from evil have in their sights is a God who is morally perfect. It simply cannot be that this God would exist and yet do anything wrong. What the argument is trying to show is that the world with all its apparent evil could not be the the work of this morally perfect God. The conclusion is not God isn’t nice, but that God simply isn’t.

Yet this confusion is fairly common. Perhaps it is partly due to how one often discusses the argument from evil. Often God is ‘put on trial’ where various defenses for his seeming misconduct are offered and scrutinized, and this sort of trial-esque game seems to imply (like a defendant) that his character is in doubt, not his existence. Regardless, it needs to be emphasized that God is not on trial in the sense that he is being called to account for his deeds, but rather the question is whether the world-as-it-seems contradicts the idea of a being with the character and resources that God is meant to have. Not least, this distinction must be made because it is possible that some argumentative moves are licit for ‘trials’, but illicit here.

Flies and Fine-tuning

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Multiverses

Charles: Consider our universe. It seems ‘fine tuned’ for life. Many of the fundamental dials of our universe need to be set ‘just so’ within an exceptionally small degree of tolerance for our universe to remain ‘life friendly’. Assuming these values can range fairly freely, that we arrived at this combination is ludicrously unlikely ‘just by chance’. If God exists though, we’d expect a universe he creates to be life friendly, because life is part of his design plan. So the fine-tuning of our universe confirms Theism over Atheism.

Debbie: Several problems. Good metaphysical sceptics like me won’t be happy to say how, or in what sense, the relevant values can ‘range freely’ (maybe they’re necessary). Ignore that though – I suspect these worries can be answered. I’m more worried about a multiverse. Take some sensible principle like “all possible worlds exist” or “every possible combination of these values exist”. If that is true, then we shouldn’t be surprised at all to see that we exist, even in a universe finely tuned (or even uniquely tuned) for life.

Charles: That seems ad hoc to me. What reason is there to suppose a multiverse, but for Atheists to explain away fine tuning data?

Debbie: Ad hoc isn’t the be-all and end-all of explanatory virtue. After all, we all should develop and modify hypotheses in light of new data. I believe some think many worlds because of certain mysteries of quantum mechanics, so for these people it isn’t an ad hoc addition to protect their atheism. Regardless, I see no reason to deny a multiverse, even if I don’t have much reason to affirm one. I should leave it as a live option. Yet, if this is a live option, then the confirmation of Theism over Atheism seems to be lacking: fine tuning becomes unsurprising because it is unsurprising on a multiverse, and that itself is unsurprising given Atheism.

Charles: Maybe so. But even if we get to ‘unsurprising’, that isn’t as good as exactly what we’d expect. Given Theism, fine tuning is exactly what we’d expect, whilst on Atheism, it is (given the live option of a multiverse) merely unsurprising. Suppose I know of two urns, one filled with white balls, and one filled with a fifty-fifty mix of white and red. I draw out a white ball. That’s unsurprising on the half-and-half urn, but exactly what you’d expect on the all-white urn. So that acts to confirm the latter.

Debbie: Sure, but I have more than a few worries about whether we should really expect life given Theism. I’m not convinced perfect beings would be motivated to create anything at all. These worries are insiginificant if you can show the fine tuning data is ludicrously unlikely on Atheism, but spring to the forefront if it’s only unsurprising.

Leave that aside, though. I think there’s a bigger worry – I don’t the argument works even if we restrict ourselves to a single universe. Continue reading “Flies and Fine-tuning” →